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ABSTRACT
The National Data Exchange (N-DEx) System is the central informational hub located at
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Its purpose is to provide network subscriptions to all
Federal, state and local level law enforcement agencies while increasing information
collaboration across all domains. The National Data Exchange users must satisfy the Advanced
Permission Requirements, confirming the terms of N-DEx information use, and the Verification
Requirement (verifying the completeness, timeliness, accuracy, and relevancy of N-DEx
information) through coordination with the record-owning agency (Management, 2018). A
network infection model is proposed to simulate the spread impact of various cyber-attacks
within Federal, state and local level law enforcement networks that are linked together through
the topologies merging with the National Data Exchange (N-DEx) System as the ability to
manipulate the live network is limited. The model design methodology is conducted in a manner
that creates a level of organization from the state level to the local level of law enforcement
agencies allowing for each organizational infection probability to be calculated and entered, thus
making the model very specific in nature for determining spread or outbreaks of cyber-attacks
among law enforcement agencies at all levels. This research will enable future researchers to
further develop a model that is capable of detecting weak points within an information structure
when multiple topologies merge, allowing for more secure operations among law enforcement
networks.
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CHAPTER 1: PURPOSE/INTENT

This chapter provides an overview of the Law Enforcement Model Design Concept and
Network Infection Spread Probability concepts that will be covered in the body of text. The
aspects to be discussed will provide a broad understanding of the methodology which creates the
foundation for the research conducted. The sections to be explored are network terminology,
network topology defined, topology model designs utilized for simulation, and the formulated
research questions. The overarching intent of this chapter as a whole is to provide a base
foundation of the required background information creating a common operational picture
among the law enforcement network architectures. The current cyber threat among all law
enforcement agencies proves the need for a model with an informational foundation allowing
easy manipulation to assess the vulnerabilities within various network structures.

1.1 Introduction – The Law Enforcement Agency Network Vulnerability Model

Law Enforcement Interoperability within the current complex operational domain creates
vast challenges for informational sharing amongst all law enforcement organizations compiling
increased risks with network vulnerabilities. The ability to share information across the United
states at a rapid pace reduces the time that officers at all levels must wait to act. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) National Data Exchange (N-DEx) system provides the
structural network framework to allow all agencies, from the local to federal levels, to integrate
1

information creating collaboration across a universal domain. The N-DEx operates in
conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) National Criminal Information
Center (NCIC) providing all available resources for criminal information to the fingertips of
police officers instantly. The National Data Exchange provides over 700,000,000 searchable
records from the local, state, and federal levels of law enforcement with new records added daily
making the National Data Exchange a living system (NDEx, 2018). The National Criminal
Information Center (NCIC) database includes 21 files (seven property files and 14-person files)
which in collaboration with the National Data Exchange provides real-time support to all law
enforcement agencies throughout the country.
The National Data Exchange has multiple methods of access for users which include web
portal through an internet connection or by a Logical Entity Exchange Specifications (LEXS)
Search/Retrieve (SR) (Management, 2018). Law Enforcement officers who choose to utilize the
LEXS-SR method to access the National Data Exchange are only able to query results on their
system, meaning these departments are only to pull information down from the federal level
(Management, 2018). The National Data Exchange users must satisfy the Advanced Permission
Requirements, confirming the terms of N-DEx information use, and the Verification
Requirement (verifying the completeness, timeliness, accuracy, and relevancy of N-DEx
information) through coordination with the record-owning agency (Management, 2018). The
National Data Exchange (N-DEx) System utilizes a search engine improving response time,
providing precision results, and improving the structured search capabilities (Management,
2018). Universal information distribution is conducted with the National Data Exchange (NDEx) System and National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) providing a common
2

knowledge base for all law enforcement agencies. National Data Exchange (N-DEx) System and
the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) provide the central link for all state-level law
enforcement organization to subscribe to in order to increase information collaboration creating a
uniform knowledge platform.
While addressing the security of the networks the issue of interoperability remains a real
and relevant issue that must be assessed in conjunction with the security to ensure future
collaboration (Hawkins, 2013). Interoperability, unfortunately, does not exist between all states
within the United states forcing the Federal level Law Enforcement platform to centralize
information at a central location to achieve a common operational picture easily accessible
across the county. The central information hub at the Federal level is the National Data
Exchange (N-DEx) System which is located within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to
allow for control of the databases supplying the database for all Law Enforcement across the
states (NDEx, 2018). The National Data Exchange (N-DEx) System contains the National
Crime Information Center (NCIC) providing network provides online access to records
concerning wanted persons, stolen vehicles, criminal histories, and other data of importance to
law enforcement and criminal justice agencies (NCIC, 2000). The intersection between
interoperability and network security becomes one of the most discussed issues among all law
enforcement agencies within the United states creating the need to understand the complex
attacks of spear phishing, the likelihood of successful intrusions and the spread of infection
based on the design of the network topology (Taylor, Epper, & Tolman, 1998). Interoperability
is defined as an essential communication link within public safety and public service wireless
communication systems which permits units from two or more different agencies to interact with
3

one another and to exchange information according to a prescribed method in order to achieve
predictable results by the U.S. Department of Justice (Taylor, Epper, & Tolman, 1998). The
cyber security threat is a continued and persistent threat with the evolving spear phishing
techniques by attackers on the law enforcement agencies. This Law Enforcement Infection
Model is designed based on the effectiveness of the spear phishing attacks reflected by the
Susceptibility variable built into the simulation model. Spear phishing for the purpose of this
model and research design is defined as a targeting attempt to steal sensitive information
identified as credentials, financial information, or personal identifiable information (PII) from a
specific individual (Giandomenico, 2018). The Law Enforcement Simulation Model assumes
the method of infection to be spear-phishing accounting for the infection probabilities assumed
for the nodes.
The Human Factor elements within the current cyber operational domain contribute to
both the levels of increased security measures as well as to the increased vulnerabilities based on
the flaws regarding the human in loop. The fact of the matter is that humans by nature are lazy
and individuals in today’s society will eventually gravitate to the least demanding course of
course (Mäses, 2015). It is inherent that mostly all security measures that are implemented
require extra effort creating additional guidelines that may be bypassed, which is considered to
degrade the value of security (Mäses, 2015). The associated vulnerabilities with the human in
the loop have developed a situation that essentially defines the weakest link within the
informational security platform as the human. In conjunction with the human vulnerability
factors, there are several aspects the must be addressed to better understand the outcomes for
data collection. The data collection analysis measures the vulnerabilities that are directly related
4

to the “Golden Rules” which are as follows: always adhering to policies, keeping passwords and
pin secret, using email and the internet with care, using caution when using mobile equipment,
reporting all virus thefts, and loses, and that all actions carry heavy consequences (Kruger &
Kearney, June 2006). Human Factors as it pertains to the Law Enforcement Model of Network
Susceptibility (LEMONS) must be calculated in conjunction with the network vulnerability to
achieve the infection probability percentages to be utilized within the simulation. The
measurement methods of human factors will be outlined in Chapter 2.

1.1.1 Network Terminology

Creating a shared understanding of the conceptual design to the above law enforcement
model design is dependent on the universal model terminology establishing a common picture
for analysis. The terms that need to be addressed are the node, edge, edge weight, and edge
arrow. The node within the model is a visualization of an entity. The edge is a visual
representation of a relation providing connection between two nodes. The edge weight is the
available load transfer whether information or traffic flow. The edge arrow identifies the
direction of travel along the edge, it is able to travel in a single direction or both directions
creating various spread patterns. The following table provides an easy visual for common terms
of reference in the development of the common understanding of the model development.

5

Table 1 - Basic Network Design Terminology

1.1.2 Network Topology Defined

The research model designed for this research thesis addresses the topology of the
Federal level Law Enforcement Network down to the local level Law Enforcement Networks.
The term network topology in relation to this model is defined as the pattern in which law
enforcement nodes (agencies) are connected to other nodes via links (edges) (Fencl, Burget, &
Bilek, 2011). The word topology descends from the Greek word topos which means place and
logos which means study (Fencl, Burget, & Bilek, 2011). Four principal topologies are used in
today’s complex operational domain which are a bus topology, ring topology, mesh topology,
and a star topology (Fencl, Burget, & Bilek, 2011). In a bus topology design is identified as a
network where all the nodes are connected to singular cable or wire (Fencl, Burget, & Bilek,
2011). The ring topology design is simply a bus design in a closed network where the
information travels the ring in one direction only (Fencl, Burget, & Bilek, 2011). The mesh
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topology design is when all the nodes are interconnected meaning every single node is connected
to all the other nodes within the network structure. The Law Enforcement Model utilizes the
Star Topology method based on the local level nodes funneling through the county, regional, and
state level nodes to the federal level database which would be considered the central node. The
star topology method states that all the nodes must be connected to one central device, however,
when clearly identifying the type of directional flow becomes relevant in the identification of the
topology. In the case of this model design the direction of flow from node to node is bidirectional meaning that an infection introduced by spear phishing or malware is able to travel
both ways. The star topology is considered to be the easiest method for implementation
regarding the design methodology in relation to the nodes and connections within a desired
network (Fencl, Burget, & Bilek, 2011). The star topology network design has advantages and
disadvantages, the advantage is nodes are able to be added with ease based on the outward
design (Fencl, Burget, & Bilek, 2011). The biggest disadvantage of the star topology design is
the singular point of failure (Fencl, Burget, & Bilek, 2011), which in the case meaning if a local
node infects the state then all the nodes under the state become at risk for infection. Star
topology in the case of the Law Enforcement Model of Network Susceptibility (LEMONS) is
implemented throughout the structures to reduce the probability of a network failure or relating
to the current model the risk of infection from the local nodes to the federal level. Understanding
the Star Topology methodology introduces increases understanding of the conceptual design of
the four topology designs implemented for this simulation model.

7

1.1.3 Topology Model Designs Utilized for Simulation

Network Topologies implemented within a simulation model such as the Law
Enforcement Model of Network Susceptibility (LEMONS) provide a foundation for comparison
based on the development of the networks among all states contributing to the federal
government. There are four topologies that are analyzed with the developed (fabricated) data
with the intent of utilizing all topologies in conjunction with real-world data to provide network
infection spread. The first topology that is considered is the Florida Law Enforcement Network
based on the network information derived from the Florida Department of Justice outlined in the
background section below 1.4 Florida Law Enforcement Network Elements (Chawdry, 2017)
consisting of 277 total nodes. The second topology that is utilized is the Pennsylvania Law
Enforcement Network based on the network information derived from the Pennsylvania
Department of Justice (Department, JNET Pennsylvania Justice Network , 2018) outlined in the
background section, consisting of 285 total nodes. The third topology implemented into the
simulation model design is the Federal level Law Enforcement Network which only takes into
consideration the Florida and Pennsylvania Networks however with the design all states could be
added within the excel file databases to create a vastly complex network. An assumption is
made relating to the topology of the Federal level Law Enforcement Network that the Florida
Law Enforcement Network regions connect directly to the N-DEx and the Pennsylvania Law
Enforcement Network regions are funneled through the central node. The assumption is being
made pertaining to the central node of the Pennsylvania Network that it is the Commonwealth
Law Enforcement Assistance Network (CLEAN) server located at the Pennsylvania state Police
8

(Department, Pennsylvania Justice Network, 2018). This topology design consists of 561 total
nodes. The fourth topology model design that is analyzed is the transformation of both the
Pennsylvania Law Enforcement Network and Florida Law Enforcement Network to a web-based
model connected to the N-DEx in conjunction with the Florida design. This type of topology
model is implemented based on the assumption within the increase in network security measures
states will move toward this which allows the lower level law enforcement agencies to connect
directly to the federal government database; this design consists of 405 total nodes.

1.2 Research Question I (RQI)

Does the infection spread among law enforcement nodes rapidly increase or decrease
within a network, based on the probability of infection at the Federal, state, region, County and
local Nodes?

1.3 Research Question II (RQII)

How does shifting the topology of law enforcement networks and increasing the
susceptibility effect the rate of infection among the Federal, state, County and local Nodes?

9

1.4 Research Question III (RQIII)

Does modifying network topology increase network security?

1.5 Research Question IV (RQIV)

How is information flow affected with different types of network topologies?

1.6 Forming a Solution

Conducting an analysis of the research formulated on a network virus infection spread
within a Law Enforcement Network advanced by (Marius Gilbert and Andrew Liebhold) in
“Comparing Methods for Measuring the Rate of Spread of Invading Populations” set a
beginning stage for analysis. The development of a Comma-Separated Values (CSV) file, nodal
alignment creating network architecture within Networkx, formulated infection probabilities, and
the susceptibility probability based a virus infection rate provides the foundation for
manipulation within a network to determine rates of spread from various law enforcement
agencies. Forming the platform for the outcome of analysis, which is the Infection Rate, is based
on the conditions developed within the initial development of the model design. The conditions
that are the driving factors within the model are the Susceptibly Rate, the Topology of the
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Network, the Infection Probabilities of the state, region, County and local Nodes that encompass
the model design. The Susceptibility condition is alternated between 0.0001, 0.001, and 0.01.
The Topologies utilized forming the conditional platform are the Florida Network, the
Pennsylvania Network, the Federal level Network (Florida and Pennsylvania combined), and the
Federal Web-Based Network Topologies. The Infection Probability condition is assumed at the
state level to be 0.001, at the region level to be 0.01, and at the county as well as local levels are
randomly generated creating various conditional states. The randomly generated data will be
discussed more in depth in Chapter 3 section 3.4 Simulation Design Methodology. All of the
above stated conditional properties contribute to the outcome of Infection Rates based on the
topology, infection probability and susceptibility to provide data for comparison as it may relate
to the human factor and network security elements as discussed in chapter 2. It should be
documented and understood that the original intent of the document stated above was for the
analysis of the biological spread, however the simple concept for infection was manipulated to
provide the layout for the various Law Enforcement Network architectures.

1.7 Thesis Organization

The organization of the following thesis research is organized in a manner which
facilitates the understanding of the development of the Law Enforcement Model of Network
Susceptibility (LEMONS). Section II of the thesis outlines the background information on the
model development, the Florida Law Enforcement Network, the Pennsylvania Law Enforcement
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Network, information security, network vulnerability, human factor vulnerability and spear
phishing. Section III outlines the methods in which data was derived and the simulation was
conducted to achieve measurable results. Section IV outlines the results of the simulation
conducted and addresses the critical research questions pertaining to the Law Enforcement
Network Infection probabilities.

12

CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND

This section provides the reader with a background of the Model Design Concepts,
Florida Law Enforcement Network breakdown, Pennsylvania Law Enforcement Network
breakdown, Information Security, Network Vulnerability Measurement, Human Factor
Vulnerability Analysis, and an understanding of Spear Phishing.

2.1 Model Design, Implementation and Background Basics

The short history of Complex Model Design utilizing python package Networkx
regarding the infection of viruses on a specified network has been developed, however the ability
to create a model for Law Enforcement Interoperability has not. The simulation model based on
the metapopulation code developed by Timothée Poisot provided the basic code platform for
node development, occupation status, and the base analysis of spread over time. The code stated
above was taken and further developed to increase the usability of the simulation, CSV file
manipulation, directed node output, directed connections, and directed probabilities associated
directly with the County and local Law Enforcement Nodes. The code breakdown as well as the
methodology derived, was taken from the Networkx Reference 1.9 (Hagberg, Schult, & Swart,
2018). The development of the CSV files utilized pertaining to the Law Enforcement Network
Model works in conjunction with the python code to extract node sizes, node labels, and
infection probabilities intended for infection comparison. The nature of the infection model is
13

based on the susceptibility of the network as a whole in conjunction with the probability of
infection at the state, region, County and local levels which is assumed for the purposes of the
execution and data collection. The development of the Law Enforcement Model of Network
Susceptibility (LEMONS) is designed providing the ability to insert real-time infection
probability data into the CSV by utilizing the human factor measurement tools alongside the
network vulnerability calculation to achieve the total infection probability value. Human Factor
vulnerabilities and Network Vulnerabilities create large risk areas even in the most secure
networks leading to the exposure of critical or sensitive information.
Along with the network vulnerability and human factor vulnerability is the infection
probability of the spear phishing attack on the desired network. Based on the structural design
and size of both Florida and Pennsylvania Law Enforcement Networks, each was chosen to be
utilized for the simulation analysis of network infection. The Florida and Pennsylvania Law
Enforcement Networks are outlined in the following subsections based on the data collected
from each of the states. The purpose for outlining each state is to ensure the understanding of the
complexity of each as well as to the amount of personnel residing within a state susceptible to
the human factor vulnerabilities.

2.1.1 Florida Law Enforcement Network Elements

The state of Florida geographically identifies 67 counties employing 387 law
enforcement agencies. The 387 law enforcement agencies employ 46,105 sworn police officers,
about 250 for every 100,000 residents. The Florida Law Enforcement network is structured with
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7 regions, where each region contains a number of counties under the regional network creating
multiple network domains within the state (Enforcement, 2018). The utilization of the seven
regions requires a networking linkage between each region to allow for information sharing
across the state which is the Florida Law Enforcement Exchange (FLEX) program (Chawdry,
2017). The seven regions use information sharing through the Florida Law Enforcement
Exchange to increase the state collaboration in conjunction with the requirement to upload data
to the National Data Exchange System (Chawdry, 2017). The Pensacola region is the first region
containing ten counties operating under the SmartCop software platform. The Tallahassee
region is the second containing thirteen counties operating under the RLEX software. The
Jacksonville region is the third region containing thirteen counties operating under the LINx
software platform. The Orlando region is the fourth region containing nine counties operating
under the FINDER software platform. The Tampa region is the fifth region containing nine
counties also operating under the COPLINK software platform. The Fort Myers region is the
sixth region containing nine counties operating under the RLEX software platform, and the
Miami region is the seventh region containing four counties operating under the RLEX software
platform as well. The following image depicts the above regional breakdown.
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Figure 1 - Florida region Breakdown (Taken from Chawdry, R. (2017). Accelerating the Data Sharing Process.
Sypher Link)

The breakdown by region identifies the implications of information sharing amongst all
law enforcement agencies within the state while exposing the potential cyber vulnerabilities.
The state and local law enforcement requirements for accessing informational databases provide
the foundation for the operation within the identified networks. Identifying the seven regional
databases converging on a neutral database connecting to the federal level database creates a
level of risk based on the number of platforms and networks to be managed within the law
enforcement network of Florida. Information sharing in the state of Florida within the FLEX
system is defined as information that is routinely collected through the everyday operations of
law enforcement agencies (Scott, 2006). Florida law enforcement agencies conduct the
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information sharing operation in a manner that requires a subscription to the other networks
running within the state as well as to the FLEX system network not only decreasing
interoperability, but increasing the cyber vulnerabilities at various entry points
(ENFORCEMENT, 2017). The state of Florida currently uses the regional hub networks from
grant money distributed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to provide
interoperability within the state, however the state of Florida is trying to merge to the single
network FLEX (ENFORCEMENT, 2017). Based on the desired network of the state the current
model identified demonstrates the regional hub connecting directly to the National Data
Exchange (N-DEx) System as well as the Florida FLEX which in reality creates a high level of
risk for a cyber intrusion to occur. The information sharing techniques utilized by the state of
Florida creates potential gaps in system connectivity requiring the need for a law enforcement
agency or officer to access multiple systems at once on the issued computer platform
(ENFORCEMENT, 2017). The increased requirements for cross-agency information
collaboration within the state of Florida to include National Data Exchange (N-DEx) System for
the purpose of state distribution exposes multiple network vulnerabilities among all agencies.
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2.1.2 Pennsylvania Law Enforcement Network Elements

The state of Pennsylvania geographically identifies 67 counties which utilize 1,117 law
enforcement agencies employing 27,413 sworn police officers, about 218 for every 100,000
residents. The Pennsylvania Law Enforcement network is structured with 15 regions, where
each region contains a designated number of counties under the regional network point to the
central network hub of the Pennsylvania Justice Network (JNET) creating a single informational
domain within the state (Department, JNET Pennsylvania Justice Network , 2018). The single
operational domain enables increased security management protocols, increased situational
awareness throughout the entire state structure amongst all law enforcement agencies at the
lowest levels. The JNET system is a web-based platform that all agency officers have access to
with the appropriate credentials providing the ability to access all criminal history, search
requirements, and the need to request desired information. The JNET requires a username and
password login, once entering the login a verification code is sent granting access to the system
for only 24 hours (Department, JNET Pennsylvania Justice Network , 2018). A new verification
code is required to access the JNET system every 24 hours providing the ability to monitor
access within the system. The singular platform operation creates risk management abilities
identifying the cyber vulnerabilities from the local departments to the state level. region A of
the JNET network contains four counties, region B of the JNET network contains four counties,
region C of the JNET network contains six counties, region D of the JNET network contains four
counties, region E of the JNET network contains four counties, region F of the JNET network
contains nine counties, region G of the JNET network contains seven counties, region H of the
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JNET network contains six counties, region J of the JNET network contains two counties, region
K of the JNET network contains three counties, region L of the JNET network contains three
counties, region M of the JNET network contains three counties, region N of the JNET network
contains four counties, region P of the JNET network contains four counties, and region R of the
JNET network contains four counties (Department, JNET Pennsylvania Justice Network , 2018).
The below figure outlines the above described regions for the state of Pennsylvania.

Figure 2 - Pennsylvania region Breakdown (Taken from Department, P. J. (2018, August 28). Pennsylvania Justice
Network. Pennsylvania Justice Network, United states. Retrieved from Pennsylvania Justice Network:
https://www.pajnet.pa.gov)

The state of Pennsylvania over the last two years has operated on a server-based system
connecting the entire state through servers which were housed at the county courthouses for
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collaboration. The transition has begun to move to a complete web-based platform to allow
every law enforcement agency to form the lowest local level to the highest federal the ability to
connect and share information with a click of a button. The sharing of information is immediate
with the web-based application creating the operational environment where collaboration is
improving the atmosphere for the law enforcement officer during random traffic stops. The
transition from the server-based network to the web-based application creates an increased risk
in relation to the cyber vulnerabilities in the current cyber environment.

2.2 Information Security

Cyber vulnerabilities among many security networks lead to breaches in the
confidentiality, integrity and the availability of information, thus, the ability to defend against
various cyber-attacks is of utmost importance in cybersecurity. According to Von Solms and Van
Niekerk (2013), information and communication technology (ICT) security describes the
protection of technology-based networks where confidential information is commonly
transmitted and/or stored. In cybersecurity, countermeasures or security controls are
implemented to help prevent and reduce potential risks caused by cyber vulnerabilities. One of
the most common forms of cyber-attacks is phishing – a scam, usually in the form of an email,
designed to gain sensitive information from an intended victim (Workman, 2008). Attackers
utilize social engineering tactics to lure and trick victims into supplying information that can be
used to corrupt and/or destroy a network. In terms of information security, the assets that need
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the greatest understanding and protection against cyber vulnerabilities, such as phishing, are the
network infrastructure itself.
The robustness of a network infrastructure with respect to various cyber vulnerabilities, is
strongly influenced by the network’s topology. Often times with regard to information sharing
networks, an attacker will attempt to disconnect a network or intensify the spread by destroying
specific edges or nodes while a cybersecurity expert defends with resilience mechanisms
(Anderson & Moore, 2006). An example of this would be an attempt to shut down an
organization's file-sharing network, like that of a Florida’s or Pennsylvania’s law enforcement
network. (Albert, Jeong, and Barabási (2000)) discovered that specific real-world networks with
scale-free degree distributions are less susceptible to random cyber-attacks than to targeted
attacks. This is related to how the topology of many scale-free networks depends on a minority
of nodes with high vertex orders to gain connectivity, however, this does not mean their
impenetrable. If an attacker was capable of destroying the “central” nodes within the network,
then all connectivity and security would be lost.
Understanding how state and local law enforcement networks are structured provides
insight into the potential cyber-attacks that the system may be susceptible to. However, exactly
how these cyber-attacks spread throughout law enforcement networks is still unknown, therefore
the ability to stop damage from spreading is limited. This study aims to introduce a model that
will simulate how various cyber-attacks spread and defense measures interact.
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2.3 Spear Phishing

The most common attack and infection occurring within the rapidly changing cyber
operational domain is Spear Phishing not only on individuals with no connection but increasing
by the day against government agencies. Extensive research has been conducted to examine the
effectiveness of phishing attacks and defenses, based on the research paper “User Context: An
Explanatory Variable in Phishing Susceptibility” written by Kristen K. Greene, Michelle P.
Steves, Mary F. Theofnaos, and Jennifer Kostick (Greene, Kostick, Steves, & Theofanos, 2018).
The problem of spear phishing is not solved but rather it is an increasing issue within the cyber
community that all law enforcement organizations are facing (Greene, Kostick, Steves, &
Theofanos, 2018). It is critical to understand that spear phishing has evolved over time shifting
from the traditional scam of obtaining user name and password to the implanted viruses within
emails (Greene, Kostick, Steves, & Theofanos, 2018). Spear phishing is determined to be
successful not based solely on the success of system vulnerabilities but rather human deception
based on the human factors aspect addressed above (Greene, Kostick, Steves, & Theofanos,
2018). The ability to understand and recognize spear phishing emails many organizations
developed training programs for individual within the specified organize to reduce the human
factor, providing the ability to address the consequences associated with the spear phishing
attacks (Greene, Kostick, Steves, & Theofanos, 2018). The research was conducted within a lab
over a 4 ½ year time frame to collect the data acquiring the results relevant to the Law
Enforcement Model Design. Along with the lab exercise, there was a survey that accompanied
examining non-lab participants assessing their responses regarding the spear phishing attempts
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made on them (Greene, Kostick, Steves, & Theofanos, 2018). The results for the experiment are
broken down into three categories which are receiving a digital voicemail, receiving an unpaid
invoice, and an order confirmation (Greene, Kostick, Steves, & Theofanos, 2018). The results
for the new digital voicemail spear phishing instance are that 11.6 percent rate (8 out of 69)
clicked on the voicemail, and 21.3 percent (13 out of 61) of the surveyors did not click on the
voicemail. The results for the unpaid invoice spear phishing instance are that 20.5 percent rate
(15 out of 73) clicked on the invoice, and 25.9 percent (15 out of 58) of the surveyors did not
click on the invoice. The results for the order confirmation spear phishing instance are that 9.1
percent rate (6 out of 66 subjects tested) clicked on the order confirmation, and 50.0 percent (30
out of 60 subjects tested) of the surveyors did not click on the order confirmation (Greene,
Kostick, Steves, & Theofanos, 2018). This research was then able to be taken to develop an
overall assessment of the percentage of vulnerability to accepting the spear phishing which was
assessed to be between the range of 43.8 percent to 49.3 percent of users accepting spear
phishing attacks (Greene, Kostick, Steves, & Theofanos, 2018). The assessment of the spear
phishing infection probability for the Law Enforcement Model Design is an assumption that
determines the level of susceptibility of the networks in relation to identifying the attacks and
stopping them before reaching the node levels. This research could be further developed to
assess the vulnerability of the network in relation to the detection of spear phishing attempts
reaching their target locations.
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2.4 Infection Model Design Foundation

Infection based model designs have been used in various cases to determines human virus
infection patterns as well as spread rate based on selected nodes within a specific model design.
The first case scenario that was analyzed to understand a simple design utilizes the SIR model,
which is a model based on the susceptibility, infection and removal of a virus within the human
loop of infection (Shulgin, Stone, & Agur, 1998). The development of this model-based code
does create a platform for understanding the Networkx package within python, however for the
purpose of the Law Enforcement Model of Network Susceptibility (LEMONS) the removal of
the infected nodes does not apply to the real-world application. The rational reasoning for this is
the nodes represent the law enforcement agencies within the states and as they become infected,
they still have a real-world mission to conduct and must be neutralized within the infected
network. The ability to become un-infected within the model is a critical piece that will be
addressed within chapter 5. Although there are many cases found that utilize the SIR model
platform the constructs were not suitable for the development of the Law Enforcement Model of
Network Susceptibility (LEMONS). The second model analyzed was the occupancy infection
model design created by Timothée Poisot referencing the base python code within the “Using
Networkx to Simulate Metapopulations in Python” which utilizes a population of nodes being
occupied at over several iterations. This particular case of code that was formed determined the
occupancy based on the probabilities associated with each node comparing them to random
numbers determining the infection status at a random rate. The research and development
conduct by Timothée Poisot were instrumental in the development of the basic model code for
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the Law Enforcement Model of Network Susceptibility (LEMONS). The concept of the code
provided the ability to understand the random number comparison determining the infection
status amongst the nodes as well as the spreading rate throughout the model. The framework as
well as foundation created by the research of these past models enabled the development of the
Law Enforcement Model of Network Susceptibility (LEMONS), needed to replicate the live
network for purposes of infection spread probabilities. The background research conducted by
various network models such as the two described above provided the mold for the Law
Enforcement Model of Network Susceptibility (LEMONS) enabling modification using CSV
files to build the model. The past research and development of models within python have been
conducted based on the instructions derived from the Networkx reference (Hagberg, Schult, &
Swart, 2018) and the expert experience of Dr. Joe Kider. The development of the model
utilizing the CSV file is instrumental in the data extraction for the purposes of the node
placement as well as the size and infection probabilities for execution within the design.
Although the Networkx reference guide clearly identifies the code for utilizing the CSV file for
data input there is no direct reference for utilization leaving the ability for usage open for
interpretation on implementation.
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CHAPTER 3: MODEL DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGY, DATA DEVELOPMENT,
SIMULATION METHODOLOGY, AND PYTHON CODE BREAKDOWN

This section describes the basic model developmental methods used in relation to the
past, current, and potential future network architectures, the basic infection probability data
development, simulation methods in detail, and a breakdown of the python code utilized for
simulation execution. The model developed in this section is intended for users who want to
replicate or build off the model in order to increase network architecture foundation. The
approach utilized in the following section utilized randomly generated data sets capable of being
replaced with real-time data of Law Enforcement Agency Network Statistics. The Python Code
approach that was used is outlined in detail within this section to provide the novice coder the
ability to replicate the model and simulation providing a very understandable foundation for
coding purposes ensuring there is a common operational picture developed.

3.1 Model Network Development

The interoperability capabilities among the Federal, state, County and local law
enforcement agencies present a cyber vulnerability that is not afforded the appropriate attention
regarding the current technological era within the Law Enforcement Community. The initial
design concept of the base model was developed utilizing paper and pencil to illustrate the node
design. The purpose of diagraming the node concept on paper developed the foundation for the
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quantity of nodes created at the local level without degrading the model design. Creating the
model layout on paper enabled the analysis of the Florida and Pennsylvania Law Enforcement
Networks from the region level to the county level and down to the local levels. Only three local
level nodes where utilized in order to model the infection rate as well as information flow, while
at the same maintaining the ability to keep the model size reasonable. The initial step before
drawing out the nodes was to determine the branches of state nodes from the FBI N-DEx system
to the state level nodes. The next step was determining the number of regions identified within
each state which created the foundation for the number of sub system networks connecting the
state levels or the FBI N-DEx system. It is critical to understand the amount of time and work
expended analyzing the sub networks of reach state, which required identification and mapping
of the counties as well as local nodes for each specific regional level node. The following figure
displays the initial county and local level node mapping on paper:

Figure 3 - Drawn County and local Nodes
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After completion of the county and local level node layout the next objective is to outline
the number of counties per region on paper providing the visualization for each regional level.
The importance of this step for each region is the connections between the region to the county
down to the local level nodes. The connections (edges) between the regions and counties are
critical in the aspect of connection identification for the future development of the relationships
among all the nodes. The following figure is an example of a Florida Network regional node
drawn out with the respective number of counties and three local nodes per county node.

Figure 4 - regional Node Drawing

Completion of the regional node drawing outlines with the respective counties and local
nodes for both of the states (Florida and Pennsylvania) develops the operational platform for the
state composition network architecture. Once the regions are detailed on paper the following
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design is to map the Florida regions to the N-DEx and the Pennsylvania regions through the
JNET node to the N-DEx Node. This provides the overarching outline of the regions to the
states to the FBI database essentially creating the top-level architecture of the model. The
drawing outlining the regions to the states to the FBI N-DEx system node can be referenced in
Appendix A in conjunction with all preliminary drawings developing the initial paper drawn
model providing the foundation for the Law Enforcement Model of Network Susceptibility
(LEMONS) development. Accompanying the initial drawings for understanding the operational
platform is a digital set of prints were developed for the ability to more clearly visualize the
connections and relationship among all nodes. This set of digital prints is able to be referenced
in Appendix B for a visual representation of the networks initially developed.
Utilizing the above referenced drawings of the node relationships, a basic model design is
developed using Python code in collaboration with the Networkx package providing the ability
to replicate the layout of the various network structures among law enforcement agencies. The
python code derived was utilized in collaboration with the research of Timothée Poisot
referencing the base python code within the “Using Networkx to Simulate Metapopulations in
Python” resource which can be found at http://timotheepoisot.fr/2012/05/18/networkxmetapopulations-python. The code used within the Law Enforcement Model of Network
Susceptibility (LEMONS) will be outlined in further detail later in this section. For the purpose
of the Law Enforcement Model of Network Susceptibility (LEMONS) design the states of
Florida and Pennsylvania law enforcement networks are used based on the network structure of
the past and current network architectures. The states of Florida and Pennsylvania are replicated
utilizing the node and edge concept to design the network structure providing the replication of
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the flow of network traffic from the lowest local level law enforcement agency to the National
Data Exchange (N-DEx) system located within the FBI. Based on the number of local law
enforcement agencies within various counties to the state level, the decision to replicate and
simulate only three agencies at the local level increases the scope of the model development
referenced in the figure 3 below.

Figure 5 - Digital local and County Node Design

Utilizing small scale node composition provides the ability to deep dive into local
agencies while at the same time keeping the broadness of scope open for a large-scale
simulation. Assigning only three local level nodes to the county nodes increases the state
participation within the model design increasing the various platforms from all states to be
incorporated within the model. For the purpose of this particular model, the states of Florida and
Pennsylvania are developed independently from each other to examine the flow of information
based on the state-dependent architecture. Florida Law Enforcement Network structure contains
seven regional nodes and the state of Pennsylvania contains fifteen regional nodes. The
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overarching network architecture demonstrated in figure 4 displays the connection from regional
nodes to state level to the National Data Exchange (N-DEx) System.

Figure 6 - Federal level Law Enforcement Network Structure to the state level

After completion of the replication of the past and current network structure utilized in
both states with various alterations in the node levels, the analysis was conducted identifying the
shift in technology creating the need to shift the network architecture. Examining the Florida
Department of Justice (Enforcement, 2018) and the Pennsylvania Department of Justice
(Department, Pennsylvania Justice Network, 2018) the manipulation regarding the topology of
the network structure is able to be done by eliminating the region level and county level nodes
within the python code creating the web-based network that many states are moving towards
based on the technological shift. Conducting this manipulation in the network architecture
produces a web-based structure for both states connecting to the federal level National Data
Exchange System referenced in the figure 5 below.
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Figure 7 - Federal level Law Enforcement Network Structure to the state level

3.2 Comma-Separated Values (CSV) File Utilization

The Law Enforcement Model of Network Susceptibility (LEMONS) structure design is
driven from the use of a Comma-Separated Values (CSV) file(s), identifying the variables (state,
state node size, state infection, region, region node size, region infection, county, county node
size, county infection, local, local node size and local infection) utilized to build the model as
well as conduct the simulation. Understanding the data input from each column with the CSV
file is critical in the development and execution of the simulation iterations allowing for random
data creation. The state column identifies the state level node; the state node size identifies the
numerical size of the state node; the state infection column inputs the infection probability of the
state node; the region column identifies the region level node; the region node size identifies the
numerical size of the region node; the region infection column inputs the infection probability of
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the region node; the county column identifies the County level node; the county node size
identifies the numerical size of the county node; the county infection column inputs the infection
probability of the county node; the local node size identifies the numerical size of the local node;
the local infection column inputs the infection probability of the local node; this information
database is able to be manipulated based on the state network procedures. Data breakdown of
the CSV file columns are organized in specific column ordered format creating the database
foundation for both the model structure as well as the simulation execution. The four CSV files
that are used for databases are the Florida Law Enforcement Network, Pennsylvania Law
Enforcement Network, Federal Law Enforcement Network and the Federal Web-Based Law
Enforcement Network. The purpose for the four different files is designed for the ability to input
accurate real time data into the database in order to enhance the simulation network replication.
The following table identifies the breakdown of the CSV file in conjunction with the data inputs
required for the model structure and simulation execution.

Table 2 - CSV File Column Data Breakdown
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3.3 Model and Simulation Data Development

The node size data development is dependent on the relation of the node to neighboring
nodes within model providing identification of the nodes. The Top-level node is identified as the
National Data Exchange (N-DEx) System, which is set at size 10,000. The state level nodes are
identified as the states of Florida and Pennsylvania, which are set at size 5000. All region level
nodes identified within the model are set to node size 3000. All County level nodes identified
within the model are set at node size 1000. All local level nodes identified within the model are
set at node size 500. Federal, state, County, and local law enforcement agencies cyber protocols
and databases are considered to be sensitive information in nature creating potential risk in the
unclassified model development. For the purpose of the model design described above the
informational database containing the infection probabilities in relation to the state, region,
County and local nodes the probabilities were developed at random (fabricated). The following
numerical values are all assumed. The state level node for the model is assumed to be set as
0.001 (.01%) and the region level node is set at 0.01 (1.0%). The county and local nodes were
derived utilizing the Random Number function within excel creating an unbiased range of
probabilities between the desired range. The county level infection probability utilized four
levels of probabilities which are as follows: =RANDBETWEEN (0,2)/100, =RANDBETWEEN
(0,15)/100, =RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100, and a fixed probability set at 0.0001. The local
infection probabilities utilized four levels of probabilities which are as follows:
=RANDBETWEEN (0,5)/100, =RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100, and =RANDBETWEEN
(0,75)/100. The final data set utilized in the simulation execution is where the state is equal to
0.0001, the region is set to 0.001, the county level is set 0.0001, and the local levels are set to
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0.0001 (only 1 node starts as infected). The use of the ranges for the both the county and local
levels imply security measures have been conducted associating the levels of risk with the
randomly generated probabilities which either identifies the risk probabilities of the law
enforcement agency. The use of the randomly generated data creates the ability to input various
data sets into the model and simulation. The development of the database for each model
enables real time data to replace the randomly generated data creating a real time model for real
data analysis. Development of real data which was outlined in Chapter 2. The above referenced
development method is outlined in figure 6 below.

Figure 8 - CSV File Infection Probability Design

The establishment of the infection probability data is only one piece of the puzzle needed
in relation to the development of the desired outcome. The Law Enforcement Simulation Model
is designed utilizing 3 independent variables which contribute to the direct output of the direct
variable. The three Independent variables within the model are the Susceptibility of the network,
the topology of the network and the infection probabilities of the nodes. The infection
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probabilities consist of the data outlined in the above paragraph. These three variables directly
produce the infection rate (dependent variable) through the simulation of the data. Upon the
output of the dependent variable (infection rate), creates the ability to calculate statistical data for
comparison among the various data sets in relation to the network architectures selected as
defined in table 6. The statistical data outputs that are utilized are as follows: the mean, the
standard error, the standard deviation, the sample variance, Kurtosis, and skewness. The
following figure clearly demonstrates the independent variables feeding the dependent variable
as well as the statistical outputs.

Figure 9 - Independent and Dependent Variable Breakdown
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3.4 Simulation Design Methodology

The purpose of the simulation model design is to replicate cyber intrusions at the local,
county, state and federal levels simulating the rate of spread of an infecting virus introduced to
the network. The introduction of a virus is dependent on the probability of risk-oriented
behaviors directly relating to the probability designated to each node representing the
susceptibility of infection directly impacting the rate and directional spread within the model.
The probability is then compared against the random function within python providing a base of
random choice numbers introducing the ability to randomly identify infected nodes. The
simulation model is designed in such a manner that the National Data Exchange (N-DEx) System
is represented by Node 1581, the regions of the Florida Law Enforcement are identified with the
respective nodes 1, 42, 96, 149, 186, 233, and 270. The Pennsylvania Law Enforcement
Network funnels through the JNET (CLEAN SERVER) which is identified as Node 304
establishing the connection from the state of Pennsylvania to the National Data Exchange (NDEx) System. The simulation is designed to run one iteration at 500 timesteps to provide 500
possible times of infection over the network. There were nine total simulation models that were
developed to dissect the infection spread through the law enforcement networks to the lowest
nodes. Before the 500 timesteps are conducted the simulation starts by producing an initially
infected plot identifying the initial nodes within the simulation based on the infection
probabilities. The methodology of simulation development was derived from the article
Comparing Methods for Measuring the Rate of Spread of Invading Populations where there were
certain parameter aspects maintained to ensure simplicity and unbiased measurements. In the
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Florida, Pennsylvania, Federal level, and Federal Web-Based level Law Enforcement Network
Simulations the parameters that were maintained are probability of infection, probability of
initial infection, and edge weight. The probability of infection is the measurement of 0.0001
compared to the status of the node which is determined with the formula np.random.uniform () <
Infected, which is comparing the random number to the probability of infection on a specific
node to determine the infection status. The probability of initial infection is the measurement of
0.001 compared to the status of the first node (1581), which is determine by the formula 1 if
np.random.uniform() < Initial_Infection else 0. This means if the random number generated is
less than 0.001 then the node 1581 is infected; else 0 means the node is not infected. The edge
weight which is maintained at the measurement of 0.005 which determined the flow of
information within the undirected graph. These simulation parameters are outlined in the table 6:
Table 3 - Simulation Infection Probability Parameter Table

Utilizing the infection parameter data sets from the above table to execute the simulations
of Florida, Pennsylvania, the Federal level Network and the Federal Web-Based Law
enforcement Network, provides the ability to achieve quantifiable data for comparison and
analysis each data set was run 4000 iterations at 500 timesteps. The purpose of the simulation
runs of 4000 iterations created the ability to derive an average for the statistical measures of
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initial node infection, average infection rate, and the average total node infection. The execution
of one simulation run takes an average of about 1 second to execute, record the data, and
1second to calculate the node infection at timestep desired. The execution of the 4000 iterations
is achieved with a Run.py file created to execute the script 4000 times while simultaneously
recording the data into a text file analysis for recoding and calculation purposes.

3.5 Python Code Breakdown

The purpose of this section is to outline in detail the python code, which is broken down
below as it pertains to the model and simulation creating a common understanding for all future
users. The python code is very basic in nature utilizing the Networkx package in conjunction
with Matplotlib to create the visual representation of the infection plots at the initial point and the
end infection node status. The first step in the code development is installing the packages
required within python to run the appropriate code. For the purpose of running the code the
platform utilized in the following code was PyCharm, which is easily operational and can be
accessed at the following location https://www.jetbrains.com/pycharm. The packages to be
installed are Networkx Package, NumPy Package, Matplotlib Package and the CSV Package.
The Networkx package provides the ability to graph the nodes and edges required for the
network development. The NumPy package provides the mathematical capabilities for random
number generation as well as statistical measures. The Matplotlib package provides the ability to
graph in figures enabling the ability to visualize the graph in real time, and the CSV package is
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utilized to read the CSV files with the network database. Additional packages are able to be
added to the code if required to increase the performance of the simulation or model. The
following excerpt displayed in figure is the code required for inputting the packages within
PyCharm Coding Platform:

Figure 10 - Package Import Code

The section of code to be utilized are the inputs of the measurements utilized in the
simulation which are agencies (comparing and displaying nodes infected on line plot), Infected
(Probability of Infection to a given node), Susceptible (Susceptibility of the whole network),
Initial Infection (the infection status of the first node created), and P_init_local (edge weight).
Next the text n_size = [] is utilized to establish a container for the nodes size variables utilized
within the excel file for the levels of the agencies such as state, region, county and local. The
code G = nx. Graph () establishes the graph within the Networkx package and the
plt.figure(figsize=(20, 15)) determines the size of the figure when printed. Time is utilized for
the start in the simulation timestep period. The mFileName = desired fire is required for drawing
the data from the database file, and the counter starts at 0 when inputting all the nodes into the
graph creating the linkage between the correct nodes. All of these coding requirements are
displayed in the following excerpt.
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Figure 11 - Condition Setting Code

The next step to begin the development of the Network Architecture Model is to insert to
create the beginning patch which establishes the node’s status, and pos. The patch is created in a
class enabling multiple patches (nodes) to be created, followed by the establishment of an object
using def_init identifying the status and pos of a particular object or node. The code def_str(self)
followed by return(str(self.status)) is used to return the status of a particular node where required
to compare the probabilities against the infection status within the model. The following excerpt
lays out the required code for the creation of the class.
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Figure 12 - Class Defining Code

Inserting data and creating the model is done so by using def LoadData (file) command
pulling the information from the database. When developing the graph of the model the initial
node is created using the global counter which starts at 0 and adds 1 for every next node that
needs to be created within the model. The counter reads the CSV file for the next line within the
file and respective node identification creating the connections based on the development of the
database. The next line within the code for the data requirement is the initial status of the first
node created where 1 is infected and 0 is normal. The determination of infection is calculated by
comparing the random number generated between 0 and 1 against the Initial Infection value.
P_Top is the top-level node using the code patch (Stat, counter) determining the infection status
and count 0. The next line in the code establishes the first node within the graph where node =
G.add_node(p_top) is the command to add node with no connections. The counter = counter + 1
establishes any following node addition must add 1 to the value in sequence creating the list.
The last piece of code within the data load section establishes the size of the top-level node using
n_size. append (10000) setting the size of the node to 10000 within the created graph. All of the
required python code for the section is in the excerpt below.
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Figure 13 - Top Node Development and Counter Code

The code required for opening the CSV file within the model development for extracting
the data is with open command as csvfile, followed by determining the reader requirement within
python telling the package to read the file with the command reader = csv. DictReader(csvfile).
The lines following those commands are required to create the required fields for the following
code in the file.

Figure 14 - Reading CSV File Code
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Reading the CSV file requires code to determine how to read the file by row or column
using the command: for row in reader followed by the line state = row [‘state’] providing the
command to read from the state level down to the local level nodes within the CSV file. The
command if state != oldstate is used to only populate one node at the state level which
determines if the same state is listed it goes onto the next cell in the row to populate the next
available node. The next line within the code for the data development is the status of the state
node where 1 is infected and 0 is normal. The formula for this is np.random.uniform() <
float(row[‘state_infection’]) where the randomly generated number is compared to the infection
probability located in the respective cell within the CSV file. The next aspect of the state
development is establishing the state node with p_state = patch (status and pos) followed by the
addition of the node at the state level. This is done using G.add_node (p_state, name=state)
pulling the information from the CSV file identifying the state being read within the appropriate
line. The next critical line of code attaches an edge from the top-level node to the state level
node with the code G.add_edge (p_top, p_state, weight=.25) where the edge is created and the
length of the edge is in relation to the weight. The next aspect of the code is to establish the size
of the state level node by utilizing the code n_size.append (int(row[‘state_node_size’])) which
means the code is reading the respective cell under state node size as in integer creating the size
of the state node. All of the required python code for the section is in the excerpt below outlining
reading file code and state level code model development.
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Figure 15 - state Node Development Code

This section of code identifies the region level node with the following line region = row
[‘region’] providing the command to read from the region level down to the local level nodes
within the CSV file. The command if region != oldregion is used to only populate one node at
the region level which determines if the same region is listed or goes onto the next cell in the row
to populate the next available node. The next line within the code for the data development is
the status of the region node where 1 is infected and 0 is normal. The formula for this is
np.random.uniform() < float(row[‘region_infection’]) where the randomly generated number is
compared to the infection probability located in the respective cell within the CSV file. The next
aspect of the region development is establishing the region node with p_region = patch (status
and pos) followed by the addition of the node at the region level. This is done using G.add_node
(p_region, name=region) pulling the information from the CSV file identifying the region being
read within the appropriate line. The next critical line of code attaches an edge from the statelevel node to the region level node with the code G.add_edge (p_state, p_region, weight=.25)
where the edge is created and the length of the edge is in relation to the weight. The next aspect
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of the code is to establish the size of the region level node by utilizing the code n_size.append
(int(row[‘region_node_size’])) which means the code is reading the respective cell under region
node size as in integer creating the size of the region node. All of the required python code for
the region level node development section is in the excerpt below.

Figure 16 - region Node Development Code

This section of code identifies the county level node with the following line county = row
[‘county’] providing the command to read from the county level down to the local level nodes
within the CSV file. The command if county != oldcounty is used to only populate one node at
the county level which determines if the same county is listed or goes onto the next cell in the
row to populate the next available node. The next line within the code for the data development
is the status of the county node where 1 is infected and 0 is normal. The formula for this is
np.random.uniform() < float(row[‘county_infection’]) where the randomly generated number is
compared to the infection probability located in the respective cell within the CSV file. The next
aspect of the county development is establishing the county node with p_county = patch (status
and pos) followed by the addition of the node at the county level. This is done using G.add_node
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(p_county, name=county) pulling the information from the CSV file identifying the county being
read within the appropriate line. The next critical line of code attaches an edge from the regionlevel node to the county level node with the code G.add_edge (p_region, p_county, weight=.25)
where the edge is created and the length of the edge is in relation to the weight. The next aspect
of the code is to establish the size of the county level node by utilizing the code n_size.append
(int(row[‘county_node_size’])) which means the code is reading the respective cell under county
node size as in integer creating the size of the county node. All of the required python code for
the county level node development section is in the excerpt below.

Figure 17 - County Node Development Code

This section of code identifies the local level node with the following line local = row
[‘local’] providing the command to read from the local level down to the local level nodes within
the CSV file. The command if local != oldlocal is used to only populate one node at the local
level which determines if the same local is listed or goes onto the next cell in the row to populate
the next available node. The next line within the code for the data development is the status of
the local node where 1 is infected and 0 is normal. The formula for this is np.random.uniform()
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< float(row[‘local_infection’]) where the randomly generated number is compared to the
infection probability located the respective cell within the CSV file. The next aspect of the local
development is establishing the local node with p_local = patch (status and pos) followed by the
addition of the node at the local level. This is done using G.add_node (p_local, name=local)
pulling the information from the CSV file identifying the local being read within the appropriate
line. The next critical line of code attaches an edge from the county-level node to the local level
node with the code G.add_edge (p_region, p_local, weight=.25) where the edge is created and
the length of the edge is in relation to the weight. The next aspect of the code is to establish the
size of the local level node by utilizing the code n_size.append (int(row[‘local_node_size’]))
which means the code is reading the respective cell under local node size as in integer creating
the size of the local node. All of the required python code for the local level node development
section is in the excerpt below.

Figure 18 - local Node Development Code

After completing the code for the development of the model architecture the next step in
the process is to establish the simulation steps pertaining to the infection status. To begin the
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simulation code section, you must first define the operation with def Simulate (Infection): this
creates the platform for execution. The next line in sequence for timestep in range (500) defines
the amount of times the simulation is cycled through. The next line Status () is printing the
status of each node after comparing the probabilities of each state, region, County, and local
nodes form the formulas above. After the completion of the initial status the next lines are
simply checking for the infection in the initial status which is then compared to the neighbors of
each infected node. The next line for n in G.nodes(): simply identifies that the simulation is
going to look at any node within the graph identified as G. Within this code the line if status ==
1 (not infected) and np.random.uniform() < Infected: then this identifies the node as infected
utilizing the code status = 1 (infected). After the initial infections have been identified the next
step is for the simulation to look at all the nodes within the graph G, where if the node is infected
using if n.status == 0 then it lists out all the neighbors of the infected node. Once these nodes are
identified the neighbor nodes are compared with a random number using if np. random.uniform()
is compared against the Susceptible value set above, which is a fluctuating variable within the
simulations between 0.0001, 0.001, and 0.01. Upon completion of the comparison of values and
infection probabilities with the nodes the first timestep is complete and is then run another 499
times to account for the 500 timesteps. Each timestep executed in the simulation sequence is
completed with the run function advancing the simulation one time by utilizing the code: time.
append (timestep + 1) and the next line of code appends the infection simulation in order to plot
each timestep of infected nodes over time. The required code conducting the simulation is in the
following excerpt.
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Figure 19 - Simulation Code Development

Once all the above code is entered and checked for errors then both the model and
simulation baseline code has been established and the next step in the process is to create and
define the main operational code which executes the previous code created. The code to define
the main operation is def main(): followed by various commands to load the data as well as
printing the CSV file information. The next critical piece of code listed within the main code
section is identifying the pos and infection status with the code occup = [n.status for n in G].
After this section, the next area of code calculates the degree and centrality of the nodes within
the graph. After this code is established the plots must be established to create the visual
representations of the initial and post simulation infection statuses. The code used to create the
initial graph is the nx.draw() command where you must input G as the graph, node_size,
node_color, and labels to provide the information required for the graph. The command
plt.savefig() is utilized to save the figure drawn at the time of creation and then the code
plt.show() must be used after each desired graph creation to develop the graph itself. To better
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develop a graph, reliable resources for matplotlib libraries are able to be viewed at
https://matplotlib.org/2.1.1/api/_as_gen/matplotlib.pyplot.plot.html. To plot the graph with the
infections of the nodes the first code to be used must be the Infection simulation code followed
by the command Simulate (Infection) which inputs the simulation result into the graph being
created. The next steps are followed as outlined above for the intial graph to populate the graph
with the infected nodes identified. After both the initial plot and the infected plot have been
established the next step is to create the line plot chart to provide a clear understanding of the
infected nodes over the course of the timesteps. The critical code for establishing the line plot is
plt.plot(Time, Infection), where the data used for developing the graph is Time on X axis and the
simulation data on the Y axis laying out the infected nodes over the 1000 timesteps. The
commands plt.xlabel, plt.ylabel, plt.grid, and plt.savefig can be used to develop an understanding
of the graph. The command plt.show() must be used to create the graph. The following excerpt
clearly outlines the code requirements for execution the simulation file.
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Figure 20 - Main Execution Code

The complete set of code is able to be referenced in Appendix C compiling all of the
above outlined python code for model development as well as simulation execution which allows
for direct implementation into any system.

3.6 Simulation Execution and Data Collection Methodology

Conducting the Florida, Pennsylvania, Federal level, and Federal level Web-Based Law
Enforcement Network Simulations was done so in a strategic manner to allow for data
production and analysis. This section outlines procedures utilized to conduct the simulations,
layout the procedures for data organization, and the methodology for achieving the averages for
comparison. The simulation is conducted by each network architecture setup (Florida,
Pennsylvania, Federal level, Federal level Web-Based) with 4000 simulation runs per the county
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and local infection probabilities which are outlined in the data development section above. After
one simulation run the data output for initial node infection and total node infection are recorded.
This is executed 4000 times per data set identified above as well in the Simulation Infection
Probability Parameter Table Figure. Upon completion of all simulation runs the data must be
organized for easy comparison across the data sets to provide functional analysis. To provide a
functional base for comparison the data is organized by Parameters and Results to achieve
common understanding of the data structure. The Parameters data section is organized by the
following categories Agencies, Timesteps, Probability of Infection, Probability of being
Susceptible, Probability of Initial Infection, Initial Edge Weight, state Infection Probability,
region Infection Probability, County Infection Probability, and the local Infection Probability.
Following the Parameters section is the results section which contains the Number of Nodes in
the Graph, Number of Edges in the Graph, Average Degree, Network Density, Initial Node
Infection, Rate of Infection, and the Nodes Infected. Both of these data areas are paired with a
line plot for each simulation that has been ran which provides detail for each simulation run.
These can be found in Appendix A though Appendix D. An example of the informational data
Parameters and results associated with each of the simulations can be viewed in the following
table.
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Table 4 - Parameters and Results Output Example

The Rate of Infection seen in the figure above is calculated first by finding the Node
Infection (NI) which is the Total Node Infection value at timestep 500 minus the Initial Node
Infection value delivering the Node Infection (NI) value.

𝑁𝐼 = 𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 @ 𝑇𝑆 500 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

( 1)

The next step is to calculate the Node Infection Rate (NIR) which is the Node Infection
(NI) value divided by 500 identifying the timestep analysis delivering the NIR. Both of these
equations can be seen in the below figures clearly identify the represented values utilized for the
calculation. The first equation defined is

𝑁𝐼

𝑁𝐼𝑅 = 500

( 2)

Upon completion of each data set simulation consisting of the 4000 iterations the average
for the required measurable values are able to be calculated. The values that are used to compare
54

the simulation data sets are the Average Initial Node Infection, the Average Rate of Infection,
and the Average Nodes Infected. The Average Initial Node Infection (AINI) is calculated by
taking the value NI then divided by 4000 (number of simulations run in the iteration) to calculate
the Average Initial Node Infection. The equation is displayed in the figure below:

𝑁𝐼

𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐼 = 4000

( 3)

After the calculation of the NI and NIR values the Average Infection Rate (AIR) can be
calculated by finding the SUM of the Node Infection Rate (NIR) where the 4000 simulation
infection rates of one iteration are added to produce a total value. This value is then divided by
4000 to deliver the AIR. The equation is displayed in the following figure below:

𝐴𝐼𝑅 =

𝑆𝑈𝑀(𝑁𝐼𝑅)
4000

( 4)

The Average Total Nodes Infected (ANI) is calculated by finding the SUM of the 4000
simulations Node Infected values producing a total value number divided by 4000 representing
the simulation within the data set iteration. The equation is displayed in the following figure
below:

𝐴𝑁𝐼 =

𝑆𝑈𝑀(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)
4000
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( 5)

Calculation of all the above values enables the platform to be established for analysis of
the average data sets within each infection probability set to be compared in relation to the
Susceptibility values against other network architectures. In conjunction with node infection
rates and average initial infections the ability to compare against network density is critical. The
network density is a representation of the connections within any given network architecture.
The denser the architecture of the network the easier it is for information to flow as compared to
a network with a sparse structure which constricts the flow of information based on the limiting
connections. The utilization of Network Density in the Law Enforcement Networks comparison
allows for the demonstration of information flow based on the given architecture within the
selected states and federal government. Network density is calculated utilizing two key
equations which provide the foundation for the numerical value demonstrating the density of a
given network. The first step is to determine the number of connections within a given network
by taking number of possible connections (N) and multiplying it with N-1 and then dividing by
2, which provides the number of Potential Connections (PC) displayed below in equation 8. The
next step is to take the number of Actual Connections (AC) and then divide that by the Potential
Connection (PC) determining the network density of the selected architecture demonstrated in
equation 9 below.

𝑃𝐶 = 𝑁 ∗

𝑁−1

( 6)

2

𝐴𝐶

𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑃𝐶
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( 7)

3.6.1 Statistical Data Development and Comparison

At the completion of development and data output of the above equations, the ability to
derive the statistical outputs is driven by the functions of utilizing excel. The purpose of using
excel for deriving a statistical data set for each simulation run iteration based on the initial node
infection, node infection at timestep 500, and infection is to provide the ability to cross examine
the data sets for each susceptibility range as well as probability sets. The method for data
development is utilized with the function (data analysis) within excel under the data tab
accessing the descriptive statistics method. This method under the data analysis tab provides the
ability to derive the summary statistics within the descriptive setting as well as the confidence
level for the mean set at .95 (95%). The summary statistics within the descriptive statistics
function provides the data for the following: mean, standard error, median, mode, standard
deviation, sample variance, kurtosis, skewness, range, minimum, maximum, μ + 1σ, μ - 1σ, μ +
2σ, μ - 2σ, and confidence level. The mean defines the average of the data set, the standard error
is the measure of the statistical accuracy of an estimate, the median is the midpoint of a
frequency distribution and the mode is the most reoccurring numerical value. The standard
deviation is the distance from the mean, the kurtosis is the sharpness of the peak of a frequencydistribution curve and the skewness is the amount of deviation from the normal distribution. All
of the above-outlined statistics are accompanied by a histogram of the 4000 iterations and the
results plotted with a normal distribution identifying the standard deviations as well as the mean
on the visible chart. The purpose of this measure is to ensure the data is identifiable in the
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simulation runs conducted allowing for cross analysis. The ability to compare the deviations as
well as the averages among the susceptibilities and probabilities ensures the platform for
infection measurements. All of the data sets are conducted in this manner to identify the
statistical measures. Figure 18 below outlines a sample of the histogram model utilized as well
as the data set table accompanying the data set for analysis.

Figure 21 - Histogram Data Set and Statistics Table

Given these methods of analyzing the statistical outcomes is based on the confidence
level of 95 percent across the board. The ability to identify the average infection rate across the
data sets creates the ability to understand the infection across the various network architectures.
Understanding and outlining the architectures enables the simulation to produce the resultoriented data that enables correlation analysis with the structure, nodes, probabilities, and
susceptibility of network infections.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

This section presents the data from the conducted simulations based on each
network architecture in correlation with the designed data sets. Tables of statistical outputs will
follow pertaining to the executed simulations.

4.1 Network Architecture Statistical Comparison

There are four network architectures utilized during the execution of the simulation to
provide the foundation for determining the infection rate (spread) based on the susceptibility of
the network, topology of the network and the infection probabilities at the various law
enforcement agency nodes. The four architectures utilized as outlined in chapter 3 are the
Florida Law Enforcement Network, Pennsylvania Law Enforcement Network, Federal Law
Enforcement Network, and the Federal Web-Based Law Enforcement Network. Understanding
the fundamentals for degrees and density provides the foundation for comparison among the
various network structures. The average degree as referred within this thesis examines the
number of connections other nodes (Hagberg, Schult, & Swart, 2018). The network density
refers to the portion of potential connections in a network that are actual connections (Hagberg,
Schult, & Swart, 2018), which is explained in chapter 3 in equations 6 and 7. The Florida Law
Enforcement Network contains 277 nodes, 276 edges, an average degree of 1.9928, and a
network density of 0.007220216606498195. The Pennsylvania Law Enforcement Network
contains 285 nodes, 284 edges, an average degree of 1.9930, and a network density of
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0.007017543859649123. The Federal Law Enforcement Network contains 561 nodes, 560
edges, an average degree of 1.9928, and a network density of 0.0035650623885918. The
Federal Web-Based Law Enforcement Network contains 405 nodes, 404 edges, an average
degree of 1.9951, and a network density of 0.0049382716049382715. Breaking down each
network architecture provides the fundamental understanding of the compositions as well as
densities enabling comprehension of the information flow capabilities as it relates to the spread
of infection. The Law Enforcement Model of Network Susceptibility (LEMONS) 10 total
simulation iterations per network architecture are based on the data sets outlined in chapter 3
table 6 which are broken down into the statistical data result explanations in the following
sections. The breakdown of statistical data encompasses the Standard Deviation (SD), the
Standard Error (SE), the Kurtosis, and the Skewness. The kurtosis regarding the Law
Enforcement Model of Network Susceptibility (LEMONS) will demonstrate the sharpness of the
frequency-distribution curve (Groeneveld & Meeden, Dec., 1984). The skewness is a measure of
the asymmetry of the probability distribution of a real-values random variable, which can be
valued as positive, negative or undefined (Groeneveld & Meeden, Dec., 1984). The overall
findings and statistical comparisons are able to be viewed in the following table below.
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Table 5 - Network Infection Rate Comparison

The complete statistical breakdown overview in correlation with the graphed results for
each iteration are available in Appendix D (Florida Law Enforcement Network), Appendix E
(Pennsylvania Law Enforcement Network), Appendix F (Federal Law Enforcement
Network), and Appendix G (Federal Web-Based Law Enforcement Network).

4.2 Florida Law Enforcement Network Simulation Results

This section provides the results of the Law Enforcement Model of Network
Susceptibility (LEMONS) for the Florida Network Architecture. The results are outlined from
simulation one through the tenth simulation.
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The first simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 1, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,2)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,5)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 5 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 130 – 131.

Table 6 - Florida Network Simulation Results Data Set 1

The second simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 2, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,2)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,5)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 6 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 131 – 132.

Table 7 - Florida Network Simulation Results Data Set 2
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The third simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 3, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.01, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,2)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,5)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 7 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 133 – 134.

Table 8 - Florida Network Simulation Results Data Set 3

The fourth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 4, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,15)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 8 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 134 – 135.
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Table 9 - Florida Network Simulation Results Data Set 4

The fifth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 5, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,15)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 9 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 136 – 137.

Table 10 - Florida Network Simulation Results Data Set 5

The sixth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 6, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.01, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,15)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 10 below; the associated graphical outputs
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for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 137 – 138.

Table 11 - Florida Network Simulation Results Data Set 6

The seventh simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 7, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,75)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 11 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 139 – 140.

Table 12 - Florida Network Simulation Results Data Set 7

The eighth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 8, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,75)/100). The
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results found from the simulation are outlined in table 12 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 140 – 141.

Table 13 - Florida Network Simulation Results Data Set 8

The ninth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 9, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.01, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,75)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 13 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 142 – 143.

Table 14 - Florida Network Simulation Results Data Set 9

The tenth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 10, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.0001, region Nodes = to 0.0001, County Nodes = to 0.0001
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and the local Nodes = to 0.0001(only 1 node infected at .25 infection probability). The results
found from the simulation are outlined in table 14 below; the associated graphical outputs for the
Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in Appendix D
on pages 143 – 144.

Table 15 - Florida Network Simulation Results Data Set 10

4.3 Pennsylvania Law Enforcement Network Simulation Results

This section provides the results of the Law Enforcement Model of Network
Susceptibility (LEMONS) for the Pennsylvania Network Architecture. The results are outlined
from the eleventh simulation through the twentieth simulation.
The eleventh simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 1, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,2)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,5)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 15 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 146 – 147.
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Table 16 - Pennsylvania Network Simulation Results Data Set 1

The twelfth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 2, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,2)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,5)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 16 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 147 – 148.

Table 17 - Pennsylvania Network Simulation Results Data Set 2

The thirteenth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 3, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.01, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,2)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,5)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 17 below; the associated graphical outputs
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for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 149 – 150.

Table 18 - Pennsylvania Network Simulation Results Data Set 3

The fourteenth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 4, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes =
to (RANDBETWEEN (0,15)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100).
The results found from the simulation are outlined in table 18 below; the associated graphical
outputs for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 150 – 151.

Table 19 - Pennsylvania Network Simulation Results Data Set 4

The fifteenth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 5, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,15)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100). The
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results found from the simulation are outlined in table 19 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 150 – 151.

Table 20 - Pennsylvania Network Simulation Results Data Set 5

The sixteenth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 6, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.01, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,15)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 20 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 153 – 154.

Table 21 - Pennsylvania Network Simulation Results Data Set 6

The seventeenth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 7, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes =
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to (RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,75)/100).
The results found from the simulation are outlined in table 21 below; the associated graphical
outputs for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 155 – 156.

Table 22 - Pennsylvania Network Simulation Results Data Set 7

The eighteenth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 8, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,75)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 22 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 156 – 157.

Table 23 - Pennsylvania Network Simulation Results Data Set 8
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The nineteenth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 9, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.01, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,75)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 23 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 158 – 159.

Table 24 - Pennsylvania Network Simulation Results Data Set 9

The twentieth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 10, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.0001, region Nodes = to 0.0001, County Nodes
= to 0.0001 and the local Nodes = to 0.0001(only 1 node infected at .25 infection probability).
The results found from the simulation are outlined in table 24 below; the associated graphical
outputs for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 159 – 160.

Table 25 - Pennsylvania Network Simulation Results Data Set 10
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4.4 Federal Law Enforcement Network Simulation Results

This section provides the results of the Law Enforcement Model of Network
Susceptibility (LEMONS) for the Federal Network Architecture. The results are outlined from
the twenty-first simulation through the thirtieth simulation.
The twenty-first simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 1, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes =
to (RANDBETWEEN (0,2)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,5)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 25 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 162 – 163.

Table 26 - Federal Network Simulation Results Data Set 1

The twenty-second simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 2, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,2)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,5)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 26 below; the associated graphical outputs

73

for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 163 – 164.

Table 27 - Federal Network Simulation Results Data Set 2

The twenty-third simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 3, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.01, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,2)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,5)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 27 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 165 – 166.

Table 28 - Federal Network Simulation Results Data Set 3

The twenty-fourth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 4, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes =
to (RANDBETWEEN (0,15)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100).
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The results found from the simulation are outlined in table 28 below; the associated graphical
outputs for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 166 – 167.

Table 29 - Federal Network Simulation Results Data Set 4

The twenty-fifth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 5, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,15)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 29 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 168 – 169.

Table 30 - Federal Network Simulation Results Data Set 5

The twenty-sixth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 6, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.01, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
75

(RANDBETWEEN (0,15)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 30 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 169 – 170.

Table 31 - Federal Network Simulation Results Data Set 6

The twenty-seventh simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 7, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes =
to (RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,75)/100).
The results found from the simulation are outlined in table 31 below; the associated graphical
outputs for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 171 – 172.

Table 32 - Federal Network Simulation Results Data Set 7
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The twenty-eighth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 8, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,75)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 32 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 172 – 173.

Table 33 - Federal Network Simulation Results Data Set 8

The twenty-ninth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 9, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.01, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,75)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 33 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 174 – 175.

Table 34 - Federal Network Simulation Results Data Set 9

77

The thirtieth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 10, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.0001, region Nodes = to 0.0001, County Nodes = to 0.0001
and the local Nodes = to 0.0001(only 1 node infected at .25 infection probability). The results
found from the simulation are outlined in table 34 below; the associated graphical outputs for the
Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in Appendix D
on pages 175 – 176.

Table 35 - Federal Network Simulation Results Data Set 10

4.5 Federal Web-Based Law Enforcement Network Simulation Results

This section provides the results of the Law Enforcement Model of Network
Susceptibility (LEMONS) for the Federal Web-Based Network Architecture. The results are
outlined from the thirty-first simulation through the fortieth simulation.
The thirty-first simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 1, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes =
to (RANDBETWEEN (0,2)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,5)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 35 below; the associated graphical outputs
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for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 178 – 179.

Table 36 - Federal Web-Based Network Simulation Results Data Set 1

The thirty -second simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 2, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,2)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,5)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 36 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 179 – 180.

Table 37 - Federal Web-Based Network Simulation Results Data Set 2

The thirty -third simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 3, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.01, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,2)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,5)/100). The
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results found from the simulation are outlined in table 37 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 181 – 182.

Table 38 - Federal Web-Based Network Simulation Results Data Set 3

The thirty -fourth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 4, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes =
to (RANDBETWEEN (0,15)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100).
The results found from the simulation are outlined in table 38 below; the associated graphical
outputs for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 182 – 183.

Table 39 - Federal Web-Based Network Simulation Results Data Set 4

The thirty -fifth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 5, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
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(RANDBETWEEN (0,15)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 39 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 184 – 185.

Table 40 - Federal Web-Based Network Simulation Results Data Set 5

The thirty -sixth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 6, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.01, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,15)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 40 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 185 – 186.

Table 41 - Federal Web-Based Network Simulation Results Data Set 6
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The thirty -seventh simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 7, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes =
to (RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,75)/100).
The results found from the simulation are outlined in table 41 below; the associated graphical
outputs for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 187 – 188.

Table 42 - Federal Web-Based Network Simulation Results Data Set 7

The thirty -eighth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 8, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.001, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,75)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 42 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 188 – 189.

Table 43 - Federal Web-Based Network Simulation Results Data Set 8
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The thirty -ninth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 9, utilizing the
susceptibility equal to 0.01, state Nodes = to 0.001, region Nodes = to 0.01, County Nodes = to
(RANDBETWEEN (0,25)/100) and the local Nodes = to (RANDBETWEEN (0,75)/100). The
results found from the simulation are outlined in table 43 below; the associated graphical outputs
for the Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in
Appendix D on pages 190 – 191.

Table 44 - Federal Web-Based Network Simulation Results Data Set 9

The fortieth simulation conducted is based on Data Set # 10, utilizing the susceptibility
equal to 0.0001, state Nodes = to 0.0001, region Nodes = to 0.0001, County Nodes = to 0.0001
and the local Nodes = to 0.0001(only 1 node infected at .25 infection probability). The results
found from the simulation are outlined in table 44 below; the associated graphical outputs for the
Initial Infection, Infection at Timestep 500, and Infection Rate can be reference in Appendix D
on pages 191 – 192.
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Table 45 - Federal Web-Based Network Simulation Results Data Set 10

Although all the above tables clearly identify and layout the statistical results per data set
by network structure the ability to cross reference infection rates by network is needed. The
infection rate comparison provides the ability to understand the infection rate in relation to the
node count as well as the network design increasing the foundation. Table 45 below outlines
each network outlined above providing the infection rate organized by data for easy comparison.

Table 46 - Network Infection Rate Comparison
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Based on the ten data sets when viewing Table 45 analyzing the infection rate increase by
topology and infection probability is able to be outlined as follows. Data set one shows an
infection rate increase by 0.037 (3.7%) from Florida to Pennsylvania, an infection rate increase
by 0.035 (3.5%) from Florida to the Federal Network, an infection rate decrease by -0.002 (-0.2
%) from Pennsylvania to the Federal Network, and a -0.072 (-7.2%) infection rate decrease from
the Federal Network to the Federal Web-Based Topology. Data set two shows an infection rate
increase by 0.041 (4.1%) from Florida to Pennsylvania, an infection rate increase by 0.155
(15.5%) from Florida to the Federal Network, an infection rate increase by 0.114 (11.4 %) from
Pennsylvania to the Federal Network, and a -0.337 (-33.7%) infection rate decrease from the
Federal Network to the Federal Web-Based Topology. Data set three shows an infection rate
increase by 0.004 (0.4%) from Florida to Pennsylvania, an infection rate increase by 0.196
(19.6%) from Florida to the Federal Network, an infection rate increase by 0.192 (19.2 %) from
Pennsylvania to the Federal Network, and a -0.427 (-42.7%) infection rate decrease from the
Federal Network to the Federal Web-Based Topology. Data set four shows an infection rate
increase by 0.033 (3.3%) from Florida to Pennsylvania, an infection rate increase by 0.066
(6.6%) from Florida to the Federal Network, an infection rate increase by 0.033 (3.3 %) from
Pennsylvania to the Federal Network, and a -0.097 (-9.7%) infection rate decrease from the
Federal Network to the Federal Web-Based Topology. Data set five shows an infection rate
increase by 0.038 (3.8%) from Florida to Pennsylvania, an infection rate increase by 0.235
(23.5%) from Florida to the Federal Network, an infection rate increase by 0.197 (19.7 %) from
Pennsylvania to the Federal Network, and a -0.394 (-39.4%) infection rate decrease from the
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Federal Network to the Federal Web-Based Topology. Data set six shows an infection rate
increase by 0.004 (0.4%) from Florida to Pennsylvania, an infection rate increase by 0.219
(21.9%) from Florida to the Federal Network, an infection rate increase by 0.215 (21.5 %) from
Pennsylvania to the Federal Network, and a -0.425 (-42.5%) infection rate decrease from the
Federal Network to the Federal Web-Based Topology. Data set seven shows an infection rate
increase by 0.025 (2.5%) from Florida to Pennsylvania, an infection rate increase by 0.032
(3.2%) from Florida to the Federal Network, an infection rate increase by 0.007 (0.7 %) from
Pennsylvania to the Federal Network, and a -0.053 (-5.3%) infection rate decrease from the
Federal Network to the Federal Web-Based Topology. Data set eight shows an infection rate
increase by 0.031 (3.1%) from Florida to Pennsylvania, an infection rate increase by 0.137
(13.7%) from Florida to the Federal Network, an infection rate increase by 0.106 (10.6 %) from
Pennsylvania to the Federal Network, and a -0.262 (-26.2%) infection rate decrease from the
Federal Network to the Federal Web-Based Topology. Data set nine shows an infection rate
increase by 0.007 (0.7%) from Florida to Pennsylvania, an infection rate increase by 0.184
(18.4%) from Florida to the Federal Network, an infection rate increase by 0.177 (17.7 %) from
Pennsylvania to the Federal Network, and a -0.346 (-34.6%) infection rate decrease from the
Federal Network to the Federal Web-Based Topology. Data set ten shows an infection rate
increase by 0.038 (3.8%) from Florida to Pennsylvania, an infection rate increase by 0.063
(6.3%) from Florida to the Federal Network, an infection rate increase by 0.025 (2.5 %) from
Pennsylvania to the Federal Network, and a -0.101 (-10.1%) infection rate decrease from the
Federal Network to the Federal Web-Based Topology.
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Based on the above outlined results the increase in infection rates from Florida to
Pennsylvania is consistent among all ten data sets based in the 8-node increase from the Florida
topology to the Pennsylvania topology. The average increase in infection rate between Florida
and Pennsylvania utilizing the 0.0001 the average susceptibility parameter is 0.0316 (3.16%), for
the 0.001 the average susceptibility parameter is 0.0366 (3.66%) and the 0.01 average
susceptibility parameter is 0.005 (0.5%). The increase in infection rates from Florida topology to
the Federal topology is consistent among all ten data sets based in the 284-node increase from
the Florida topology to the Federal topology. The average increase in infection rate between
Florida and the Federal level utilizing the 0.0001 susceptibility parameter is 0.044 (4.4%), the
0.001 susceptibility parameter is 0.175 (17.5%) and the 0.01 susceptibility parameter is 0.199
(19.9%). The increase in infection rates from Pennsylvania topology to the Federal topology is
consistent among all ten data sets based in the 276-node increase from the Pennsylvania topology
to the Federal topology. The average increase in infection rate between Pennsylvania and the
Federal level utilizing the 0.0001 susceptibility parameter is 0.012 (1.2%), the 0.001
susceptibility parameter is 0.139 (13.9%) and the 0.01 susceptibility parameter is 0.194 (19.4%).
The decrease in infection rates from the Federal level topology to the Federal Web-Based
topology is consistent among all ten data sets based in the 156-node decrease from the Federal
level topology to the Federal Web-Based topology. The average increase in infection rate
between Federal level topology to the Federal Web-Based topology utilizing the 0.0001
susceptibility parameter is -0.074 (-7.4%), the 0.001 susceptibility parameter is -0.331 (-33.1%)
and the 0.01 susceptibility parameter is -0.399 (-39.9%).
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This section provides a summary of the results, contributions to the research, issues, and
limitations encountered during the research, and the potential for future research as well as the
implementation of the Law Enforcement Model of Network Susceptibility (LEMONS).

5.1 Results and Contributions

Based on the cybersecurity risks and issues on the rise in correlation to the Law
Enforcement community networks, the research of infection probabilities at the various law
enforcement levels is truly critical and possess the potential to directly affect the security of the
Law Enforcement Network structures at all levels and agencies. This work and research were
focused on the shifting network topologies in relation to the infection probabilities identifying
the infection rates in correlation to the virus injected within a specific network. The simulated
virus was utilized in the form of the susceptibility of the network in conjunction with the random
number generation compared to the infection probabilities determining the initial status of each
and every node within the simulation.
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5.1.1 Infection Rate Comparison

The results comprised in chapter 4 can be analyzed based on the node counts and
infection rates based on the data sets by network structure. There are several observations that
can be made according to the data outcome, where the first major observation is based on the
number of nodes within a given network architecture will increase the infection rate based on the
connections available to increase the spread of a virus. This is clearly identified when viewing
table 45 in chapter 4, which provides the comparison for each topology utilized identifying the
web-based topology as the lowest risk for infection spread. The second observation is the level
of infection probabilities at each of the node levels dramatically alters the infection rate based on
the network topology in relation to the infection probability levels. The nodes located at the
local level pose a greater risk for infection as the data sets are cycled through produce higher
levels of infection rates based on the RANDBETWEEN (0,75)100, which identifies the highest
level of infection probability within the simulation. The nodes at the county level pose the
second greatest threat for infection spread based on the infection probability within the data sets.
Based on the above statistical analysis provided in chapter 4, one can conclude by
utilizing a topology where network communications pass through from the local level to the
county level to the region and to the state creates a more vulnerable platform for infection to
spread based on the paths for information to travel increasing risk. The conclusion proven with
statistical data regardless of the vulnerability of the nodes at various level the web-based
approach is the most secure network topology to be utilized creating less intrusion risks when
utilizing a singular tunnel for information sharing, while simultaneously monitoring the security

89

of the tunnel. Even with vulnerable nodes the mitigation of spread is provided based on the
security of the main hub node ensuring increased network security.

5.1.2 Research Question I (RQ1) Results

The answer to RQ I is the infection probability at the Federal, state, region, County and
local Nodes directly impact the spread of the infection. The infection is spread at higher rates
throughout the topology if the infection probabilities are higher among the nodes creating more
risk for not only initial infection but also infection throughout the simulation. It should be noted
that for the simulation the probabilities selected were essential in the comprehension of spread
impacts among law enforcement agency vulnerabilities (nodes) as the lower infection
probabilities did, in fact, mitigate the infection spread at a much higher rate.

5.1.3 Research Question II (RQII) Results

The answer to RQ II is shifting the topology alone, whether increasing/decreasing the
node count or utilizing the web-based topology does in fact directly affect the infection rate.
Adding nodes within a network structure increases the infection spread due to the increased
network density (connections) among the nodes. However, the exception, by increasing the node
count and eliminating the path of travel for information travel utilizing the web-based topology
mitigates the infection spread dramatically by approximately -0.101 (10.1%) from the Federal
Network utilizing the susceptibility 0.0001 and 0.0001 infection probability for all nodes. The
susceptibility alteration does, in fact, increase the infection as the susceptibility increases from
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0.0001 to 0.001 to 0.01 which varies based on the topology utilized. In relation to each other the
topology and susceptibility, increases the infection rate based on node counts as well as overall
susceptibility. The overall impact of the topology and susceptibility provides the foundation for
analysis amongst the selected network in relation to the overall security providing the ability to
input real world network security measures into the simulation.

5.1.4 Research Question III (RQIII) Results

The answer to RQ III is by modifying network topology does in fact increase network
security based on the statistical outcomes outlined in the above section 5.1.1 Infection Rate
Comparison. The modification of the topologies by eliminating edges increases the network
security mitigating the infection rate. This is compared to having multiple information tunnels
for collaboration versus forcing all information to travel through one tunnel of flow which is
closely managed for cyber spear phishing threats.

5.1.5 Research Question IV(RQIV) Results

The answer to RQ IV is the information flow among the various network topologies is
determined based on the edges within the specific network creating the path of travel for
information. In the Florida, Pennsylvania, and Federal Networks the configurations are similar
where the information travels from the lowest level node through three levels of nodes to reach
the N-DEx node, and the Federal Web-Based the information must on travel through one node to
reach the N-DEX node. The impact of this is information flow is constricted when in a complex
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network versus non-complex (web-based) as well as taking into account the infection
probabilities per node creating a very complex model to understand the effects of viruses within
the network.
Understanding the results and comparison of the topologies presented provides the
foundation for real-world data to be entered into the Law Enforcement Model of Network
Susceptibility (LEMONS) platform the following two sections 5.2 and 5.3 outline the proposed
methods to establish the real-world infection probabilities for law enforcement agencies.

5.2 Network Vulnerability Measurement

In the current Cyber operational domain, the ability to acquire and utilize real time
network data from law enforcement agencies are considered to be a risk based on the sensitivity
of the data as well as the classification of the model to execute the analysis. Therefore, the
infection probabilities are all assumed (fabricated using Microsoft Office Excel) to achieve
realistic comparable results. The development of real data based on the vulnerability of a
specified law enforcement agency network would be calculated based on the research from
Metrics of Security (Cheng, Deng, Li, Deloach, & Singhai, 2012) identifying the Vulnerable
Host Percentage (VHP). The VHP metric can represent the overall security level of a desired
network. The number of vulnerable hosts within a desired law enforcement network is able to be
derived by conducting a scan of a network utilizing a vulnerability scanning tool, which
identifies the number of active ports The equation for deriving the VHP is represented below in
Equation 1 modified from Metrics of Security (Cheng, Deng, Li, Deloach, & Singhai, 2012).
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Equation 1 represents the identified network, V is the sum of vulnerable hosts, and H is the sum
of all hosts within the desired law enforcement network (Cheng, Deng, Li, Deloach, & Singhai,
2012).

𝑉𝐻𝑃(𝐺) =

100 𝑥

𝑉
𝐻

2

( 8)

The vulnerable host percentage equation has been simplified to the lowest level to allow
for simple and quick real data collection as well as input into the database. The ability to input
real, accessible data would provide a platform for all agencies to utilize in order to assess their
cyber readiness against other agencies. After identifying the vulnerabilities associated with a
specified network the next step is to identify the severity of each vulnerability identified based
on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) which is identified in Table 2 below
reprinted from Metrics of Security (Cheng, Deng, Li, Deloach, & Singhai, 2012).

Table 47 - Severity levels of Vulnerabilities

Note. Reprinted from “Metrics of Security”, by Cheng, Y., Deng, J., Li, J., Deloach, S., & Singhai, A., 2012,
National Institute of Standards and Technology
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The past research conducted in relation to the vulnerability of the network as it pertains to
the infection probabilities provides the foundation for enhancing the ability to input reliable,
measurable, and effective data in to the simulation. Understanding the research conducted
provides the ability to effectively calculate the infection in conjunction with the human factor
research outlined in the section below. It is should be noted this has been introduced as a
stepping model with the intent to develop a probability model for real time infection data.

5.3 Human Factor Vulnerabilities Analysis

The Human Factor contribution to the model development has been researched in depth
using surveys and questionnaires to assess the vulnerabilities within various organizations. This
research methodology was conducted by Sten Mases outlined in the report Evaluation Method
for Human Aspects of Information Security which outlines critical aspects of the vulnerabilities
relating to the human in the loop risks (Mäses, 2015). The first aspect of this research is relevant
to the Law Enforcement Model with the understanding of the vulnerabilities associated with the
human factors concept among the informational platforms of the law enforcement community
creating large risks for sensitive data. The evaluation method outlined in this paper address the
knowledge-attitude-behavior (KAB) model which iterates the role of knowledge as it pertains to
the logical relation to the intentionally related behaviors, where the KAB model suggests the
behavior of an individual changes gradually (Mäses, 2015). It is important to highlight this study
states clearly the belief the relationship between knowledge, attitude and behavior is influenced
by many individuals, intervention and organizational factors (Mäses, 2015). The KAB model
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was used to create a prototype for assessing information security awareness and as it pertains to
the Law Enforcement Model Design would contribute to the calculation of the infection
probability for the law enforcement organizations (Mäses, 2015).
The use of the KAB model provided the foundation for the ability to develop and
evaluation of the human factor relating to information security by examining defined
characteristics (Mäses, 2015). The examination questions identified within this report measured
the security conscious behavior pertaining to information security were open-ended addressing
information sharing, sensitive information handling and password management (Mäses, 2015).
Although the method to change security awareness is the intent of this research paper the Law
Enforcement Model Design is only interested in the risk-oriented behaviors relating to the
probability values. In an attempt to discover the knowledge, attitudes and behaviors relating to
the issue of information security within a desired network 35 questions were developed
regarding the Golden rules (Mäses, 2015) as outlined in Chapter 1. The 35 questions were
derived relating to 21 sub-areas outlined in the paper Evaluation Method for Human Aspects of
Information Security which provided the feedback for the information security vulnerability or as
it relates to the Law Enforcement Model Design infection probabilities values respective to the
node levels. The questions utilized for the relative exam are located within the document which
are necessary to be implemented within any law enforcement organization to determine the
levels of knowledge and experience within the cyber operational domain.
Although the above research was conducted to implement a survey and experiment with
ability to derive results-based data for the Law Enforcement Model into a scalable table is
essential to achieve a probability for analysis. The methodology for the development of the
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criteria table, as well as the grading table for the purpose of finding a desired probability has
been developed which is outlined in “A Human Error Probability Estimate” by C.S. do
Nascimento and R.N. de Mesquita (Nascimento & Mesquita, 2009). This research provides the
fundamental understanding and association with the education levels as well as experience on the
job creating a measurable scale. The development of variable groups within the criteria provides
the ability to assess knowledge level in correlation with years of experience (Nascimento &
Mesquita, 2009). The grading table was introduced to weight the data composition creating the
ability to formulate the total for both Network Education as well as Experience as it relates to the
Law Enforcement Network Model (Nascimento & Mesquita, 2009). The Network Security
Vulnerability Assessment Criteria was modified from the original in the research paper to
address the probability of infection statuses within the Law Enforcement Model. The table can
be viewed below.

Table 48- Network Security Vulnerability Assessment Criteria (modified from (Nascimento & Mesquita, 2009)

The modification of the criteria table provided the foundation for the development of the
grading table Network Security Vulnerability Grading Table which was derived from the above
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identified research paper regarding assessment. The Network Security Vulnerability Grading
Table can be viewed below.

Table 49- Network Security Vulnerability Grading Table (modified from (Nascimento & Mesquita, 2009)

The foundation provided by C.S. do Nascimento and R.N. de Mesquita in the
development of the tables above leads directly to the equation formulation which was modified
from the original variation to meet the output requirements of the infection-based probabilities
within the Law Enforcement Model Design. The equation represented for the Human Factor
Network Vulnerability Value (HFNVV) is calculated by taking the PEi value (P1 + P2) which is
then divided by the ∑ PEi (total value of all possible PEi combinations). The outcome is then
multiplied by 2.777775 to account for 50 percent of the infection probability values based on the
assumption the Human in the Loop factor is significant. The explained equation above is
outlined below:

𝐻𝐹𝑁𝑉𝑉 =

𝑃𝐸𝑖
∑𝑃𝐸𝑖
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∗ 2.777775

( 9)

5.4 Future Work and Limitations

The Law Enforcement Model of Network Susceptibility (LEMONS) product has been
developed in such a manner that future work is able to be conducted in conjunction with already
established databases as well as code structures. The work that could be implemented in the
future is firstly the ability to establish the code for recovery of an infected network node creating
the ability to alter the infection rate over the timestep periods within the simulation. In
conjunction with the recovery aspect of the code the database can be altered to increase the state
count as well as the local node increasing the complexity of the model to more accurately
replicate the live network. The critical aspect of the future work is that it is not limited but rather
enhanced based on the technological changes to come within the cyber community. The ability
to implement unforeseen desired advantages for the simulation aspect to increase the
understanding of the law enforcement network vulnerabilities.
The limitations that occurred within the timeframe of conducting the research, design and
implementation of this thesis project were a wide range of aspects. The first limitation
encountered during the development of the Law Enforcement Model of Network Susceptibility
(LEMONS) was limited coding knowledge and ability creating various road blocks as well as
time-consuming weeks to complete the design. The second limitation encountered during the
research and development was the lack of established similar model designs creating the need to
develop the model from the ground up to provide the foundation for the CSV file usage allowing
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for data inputting simple. The limitations are not stoppages but rather hurdles along the way that
restricted the development of the desired outcome.
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APPENDIX A. HAND SKETCHED NETWORK DIAGRAM NODE LAYOUT
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APPENDIX B. DIGITAL NODE DIAGRAMS
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APPENDIX C. COMPLETE PTYHON CODE FOR MODEL AND SIMULATION
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#!/usr/bin/env python
# encoding: utf-8
# Modified slightly from the gist at:
# http://timotheepoisot.fr/2012/05/18/networkx-metapopulations-python/
import networkx as nx
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import csv
Agencies = 1 # Number of patches
Infected = 0.0001 # Probability of Infection
Susceptible = 0.01 # Probability of being Susceptible
Initial_Infection = 0.001 # Probability that a patch will be infected at the beginning
P_init_local = 0.005 # made this high to weight the edge of the graph to start

n_size = []
G = nx.Graph()
plt.figure(figsize=(20, 15))
Time = [0]
mFileName = "Florida_Law_Enforcement_Network.csv"
counter = 0

class patch:
def __init__(self, status=0, pos=0):
self.status = status
self.pos = pos
def __str__(self):
return (str(self.status))

def LoadData(file):
# Ty way. or the high way.
global counter
Stat = 1 if np.random.uniform() < Initial_Infection else 0
Pos = (np.random.uniform() * 10 - 5, np.random.uniform() * 10 - 5)
p_top = patch(Stat, counter)
node = G.add_node(p_top, time='1pm', name="N-DEx")
counter = counter + 1
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n_size.append(10000)
with open(file, newline='') as csvfile:
reader = csv.DictReader(csvfile)
state = ""
oldstate = ""
state_counter = 0
county_counter = 0
region_counter = 0
local_counter = 0
region = ""
oldregion = ""
county = ""
oldcounty = ""
local = ""
oldlocal = ""
p_state = ""
p_reg = ""
p_count = ""
for row in reader:
# Print the data (for debugging purposes - comment out.)
# print(row['state'], row['state_infection'], row['region'], row['region_infection'],
row['county'],
# row['county_infection'], row['local'], row['local_infection'])
# This is quick and dirty just to prove you can do it.
state = row['state']
# state level.
# if its a new state make a new top node.
if state != oldstate:
# Stat = 1 if np.random.uniform() < state_infection else 0
Stat = 1 if np.random.uniform() < float(row['state_infection']) else 0
Pos = (np.random.uniform() * 10 - 5, np.random.uniform() * 10 - 5)
p_state = patch(Stat, Pos)
G.add_node(p_state, name=state)
G.add_edge(p_top, p_state, weight=.25)
state_counter = counter
counter = counter + 1
oldstate = state
n_size.append(int(row['state_node_size']))
region = row['region']
if region != oldregion:
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# Stat = 1 if np.random.uniform() < region_infection else 0
Stat = 1 if np.random.uniform() < float(row['region_infection']) else 0
Pos = (np.random.uniform() * 10 - 5, np.random.uniform() * 10 - 5)
p_reg = patch(Stat, Pos)
G.add_node(p_reg, name=region)
G.add_edge(p_state, p_reg, weight=.25)
region_counter = counter
counter = counter + 1
oldregion = region
n_size.append(int(row['region_node_size']))
county = row['county']
if county != oldcounty:
# Stat = 1 if np.random.uniform() < county_infection else 0
Stat = 1 if np.random.uniform() < float(row['county_infection']) else 0
Pos = (np.random.uniform() * 10 - 5, np.random.uniform() * 10 - 5)
p_count = patch(Stat, Pos)
G.add_node(p_count, name=county)
G.add_edge(p_reg, p_count, weight=.25)
county_counter = counter
counter = counter + 1
oldcounty = county
n_size.append(int(row['county_node_size']))
local = row['local']
if local != oldlocal:
Stat = 1 if np.random.uniform() < float(row['local_infection']) else 0
Pos = (np.random.uniform() * 10 - 5, np.random.uniform() * 10 - 5)
# local level
p_loc = patch(Stat, Pos)
G.add_node(p_loc, name=local)
G.add_edge(p_count, p_loc, weight=.25)
local_counter = counter
counter = counter + 1
n_size.append(int(row['local_node_size']))

def Status():
for n in G.nodes():
return n

def Simulate(Infection):
for timestep in range(500):
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Status()
## Check for infections
for n in G.nodes():
if n.status == 1 and np.random.uniform() < Infected:
n.status = 1
## Check for Agencies that are infected
for n in G.nodes():
if n.status == 0:
neighb = G[n] # That's it, a list of the neighbors
for nei in neighb:
if nei.status == 0:
if np.random.uniform() < Susceptible:
nei.status = 1
break
Time.append(timestep + 1)
Infection.append(np.sum([n.status for n in G]) / float(Agencies))
def main():
print("Loading Data from file.... ", mFileName)
LoadData(mFileName)
pos = {}
for n in G.nodes():
pos[n] = n.pos
occup = [n.status for n in G]
degree = nx.degree_centrality(G)
print(degree)
bw_centrality = nx.betweenness_centrality(G, weight=10)
print(bw_centrality)
plt.title('Initial Infection Status', fontsize=30)
nx.draw(G, center=1581, node_size=(n_size), node_color=occup, with_labels=False,
cmap=plt.cm.plasma,
vmin=0, vmax=1)
plt.savefig('beginning_infection/Florida_Law_Enforcement_network_start_infection_01[25_75].
png')
plt.show()
Infection = [np.sum([n.status for n in G]) / float(Agencies)]
Simulate(Infection)
plt.figure(figsize=(20, 15))
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plt.title('Post Simulation Infection Status', fontsize=30)
nx.draw(G, center=1581, node_size=(n_size), node_color=[n.status for n in G],
with_labels=False,
cmap=plt.cm.plasma, vmin=0, vmax=1)
plt.savefig('end_infection/Florida_Law_Enforcement_network_end_infection_01[25_75].png')
plt.show()
# line plot
plt.title('Node Infection over Time', fontsize=15)
plt.plot(Time, Infection)
plt.xlabel('TIME')
plt.ylabel('INFECTED')
# Customize the major grid
plt.grid(which='major', linestyle='-', linewidth='0.5', color='red')
# Customize the minor grid
plt.grid(which='minor', linestyle=':', linewidth='0.5', color='black')
plt.savefig('infection_timeplot/Florida_Law_Enforcement_network_plot_01[25_75].pdf')
plt.tight_layout()
plt.show()
data = [np.sum([n.status for n in G]) / float(Agencies)]
print(nx.info(G))
print(nx.degree_histogram(G))
density = nx.density(G)
e1 = sum(occup)
e2 = sum(data)
e3 = (e2 - e1)/500
print("Network density:", density)
print('Initial Node Infection =', e1)
print('Nodes Infected =', e2)
print('Infection Rate =', e3)
print(e1)
print(e2)
print(e3)
#print(e1, e2, e3, file=open("output_0001_0001_0001.txt", "a"))

if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
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